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Does the Federal Crime Bill's Hunter
Harassment Provision Violate the First
Amendment or If an Animal Rights
Protester Falls Down in the Woods and a
Hunter Hears, Is It a Federal Crime?
JEFFREY E. SHERR"
Neatly camouflaged in the vast Federal Anti-Crime bill passed
by Congress in 1994 is a seemingly innocuous statute entitled "Ob-
struction of a lawful hunt."'1 This statute, which makes it illegal for
a person "intentionally to engage in any physical conduct that sig-
nificantly hinders a lawful hunt,"2 passed easily through the Senate
by a 95-4 vote, with no floor debate and no public hearings.3 It was
slipped into the part of the anti-crime bill referred to as the
"managers' package," a political reward, negotiated by the chairman
and ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee -
Joe Biden (D-Del.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).4 The primary movers
behind the bill were the National Rifle Association and the
Congress's Sportsmen's Caucus, which included 159 member of the
House and 33 Senators.5 Forty-seven states already had similar
hunter harassment bills which were rarely enforced because they
raise significant constitutional questions.6 With the passage of this
federal hunter harassment bill all federal land, about one-third of the
entire United States, is covered by this troublesome and constitu-
Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW; J.D., Class of 1996, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1990, University of Kansas.
1 16 U.S.C. § 5201 (1994).
2 id.
' Roger Simon, Surprise: Anti Crime Bill Says You Can't Peacefully Protest
Hunting, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 28, 1993, at 8D [hereinafter Simon].
4 Id.
Nat Hentoff, Open Season on the First Amendment, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 25,
1993, at A23.
6 Simon, supra note 3.
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tionally suspect law.'
Hunters argue that these statutes are necessary to promote the
important government interests of managing wildlife populations
and maintaining order and safety in the taking of wildlife.' Hunters
defend their passion as well. They point out that if wildlife popula-
tion is not controlled by human intervention animal populations
would grow too large and many animals would starve or die from
disease.' Hunters also argue that they make significant economic
contributions by paying for taxes, permits, stamps, and licenses.
0
Norman Brunig, director of sanctuaries for the National Audubon
Society claims that "hunters and fishermen have paid a dispropor-
tionate amount of the costs of wildlife management through license
fees and excise taxes.... If license money drops .... those funds
will have to be replaced by other sources.""
An argument made in favor of hunter harassment laws is the
"obvious possibility that individuals in the woods who have weap-
ons may become quite irritated and respond with violence if pre-
vented from pursuing their lawful activities."" The concern over
the possibility of violent encounters between animal rights activists
and the hunters they are attempting to disrupt is brought up by
many commentators as a rationale for these laws. "The act is in-
tended to keep potential conflict from turning into bloodshed....
Anyone who stands 10 feet in front of a loaded and aimed .30-06 is
not just flapping his gums. That's conduct, and dangerous conduct
at that."' 3
Animal rights activists strongly disagree with the assertion that
hunting is a necessary element of managing wildlife. They argue
that the population problems hunters are allegedly curing were
caused by humans killing off natural predators and that the solution
is to return natural predators such as wolves, bears, and coyotes to
their original ranges.' 4 Animal right activists also note that natural
I Id.
John A. Grafton, Note, Hunter Harassment Statues: Do They Shoot Holes into
the First Amendment?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 195 (1993) [hereinafter Grafton].
' id. at 196.
Io Id. at 197.
" Ben Brown, Hunting Under Fire Criticism of the Sport Escalates, USA TODAY,
Nov. 16, 1989, at IC.
2 Grafton, supra note 8, at 197.
t3 James J. Kilpatrick, Hunter Harassment Laws: Is Standing in front of a loaded
rifle protected by the First Amendment, ATL. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A9.
" INGRID NEWKIRK, SAVE THE ANIMALS! 101 EASY THINGS You CAN Do, 95
(1990).
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predators keep the prey strong by killing primarily weak and sick
animals while hunters seek out the strongest and most fit, thus inter-
fering with natural selection and leaving only the weak to reproduce
a weaker, more disease prone line of descendants.15
Some animal rights groups urge members to take action on
behalf of hunted animals. 6 Most of these suggestions address
changing public opinion and lobbying Congress, but several of these
actions are now prohibited by the federal hunter harassment stat-
ute. 7
Meanwhile, animal rights activists argue that the hunter harass-
ment statute violates their free speech liberties granted by the First
Amendment. Robert Peck, legislative counsel for the American Civil
Liberties Union pointed out four problems with the federal anti-
harassment law:
1. It bans peaceful protest.
2. It is not "viewpoint neutral." It affects those opposed to
hunting, not those in favor of it.
3. It is "inherently vague," because the clause that says you
cannot "interfere with a hunter" can mean virtually anything.
4. It provides for "prior restraint," allowing hunters to stifle
speech before it has a chance to occur.' 8
" Aileen M. Ugalde, Comment, The Right to Arm Bears: Activists' Protest Against
Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1112 (May, 1991) [hereinafter Ugalde].
16 E.g., NEwKIRK, supra note 14, at 96. See also Ugalde, supra note 15, at 1109.
" For example, Ingrid Newkirk, National Director of People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) recommends that activists:
Create an environment hostile to hunting. Spread deer repellent
(available at feed and hardware stores), or hang little mesh bags of human
hair (from a salon or barbershop) two or three feet above the ground
along deer tracks, warning deer that humans have invaded their terrain. If
hunters use dogs in your area, sprinkle a female dog's urine in heavily
hunted areas or spray a solution of chopped garlic cloves soaked in water
or diluted lemon juice on leaves and trails to throw dogs off the scent.
Remove the food piles hunters sometimes leave as bait in hunting areas
and scatter human hair or urine over the area.
Go into the woods the day before hunting season begins, and loudly
play a radio or recordings of wolf howls and walk with dogs on leashes.
Such tactics are particularly important for scattering younger animals who
have not yet known the traumatizing experience of being hunted.
During hunts, assemble a group of people early in the morning and
use airhoms and whistles to warn animals into hiding. Or play the national
anthem on a bugle or tape and see if the hunters stand up!
NEWKIRK, supra note 14, at 96-97.
" Simon, supra note 3, at 8D.
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This note will examine the federal hunter harassment statute,
possible constitutional attacks which may be made upon it, and the
likely results of those contests.
I. THE STATUTE
The "Obstruction of a lawful hunt" statute specifically prohibits
any intentional "physical conduct that significantly hinders a lawful
hunt" taking place upon federal lands. 9 The chapter defines "feder-
al lands" as "(A) national forests; (B) public lands; (C) national
parks; and (D) wildlife refuges."2 Congress carefully defined con-
duct not to "include speech protected by the first article of amend-
ment to the Constitution."" In addition to imposing penalties of
"not more than $10,000, if the violation involved the use of force or
violence, or the threatened use of force or violence, against the
person or property of another person" 2 and "not more that $5,000
for any other violation" 3, the statute also contains a provision pro-
viding that injunctive relief may be sought by "(1) the head of a
State agency with jurisdiction over fish or wildlife management; (2)
the Attorney General of the United States; or (3) any person who is
or would be adversely affected by the violation.,
24
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
in part, that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech. '2' The first step in determining whether a statute
violates the first amendment is to determine whether the statute's
regulation of speech is content-based or a content-neutral. If the
regulation is based on the content of the speech, the restriction must
pass the Court's most "exacting scrutiny" to be found valid. 26 Con-
tent-based restrictions are subjected to heightened scrutiny 7 be-
cause they limit expression of a particular viewpoint and place lim-
16 U.S.C. § 5201.
16 U.S.C. § 5207(1).
21 16 U.S.C. § 5207(8).
22 16 U.S.C. § 5202(b)(I).
23 16 U.S.C. § 5202(b)(2).
2- 16 U.S.C. § 5203.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
" Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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its on the "marketplace of ideas."28 To be held constitutional, a
content-based regulation must serve a "compelling state interest"
and be "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 9
A regulation is content-neutral only if its restrictions do not
discriminate as to the content of the speech.3" A content-neutral
restriction applies impartially to all view points." The test for con-
tent-neutrality is to see if there is any reference to the content of the
restricted speech in the statute itself32 or in the motive of those
enacting it.33 Intent to discriminate based on the content of the
speech may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but evidence of a
disparate effect in itself is not dispositive on the issue of intent.
34
Content-neutral regulations are subjected to a lower scrutiny and are
almost never found to be unconstitutional.35
A. Symbolic Expression
A non-verbal action can also be protected by the First Amend-
ment if it is meant to convey a particular message.36 The following
three cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's approach to Symbolic
Expression.
1. United States v. O'Brien
37
During the Vietnam War, O'Brien and several other protesters
burned their draft cards on the steps of the South Boston Court-
house 38 then were prosecuted under a federal statute that made it a
crime for any person to forge, alter, knowingly mutilate, or other-
wise change a draft card. 39 O'Brien argued that his non-verbal act
was "symbolic speech" aimed at influencing others to protest the
war', thus the statute prohibiting the burning of draft cards was
2 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
29 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
3 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
3 Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77 at 83.
3 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34 See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
" See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
36 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
3' 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
38 Id. at 369.
39 Id. at 367.
Id. at 375-76.
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unconstitutional as applied because it restricted his freedom of
speech.4
The Court held that even if O'Brien was being perfectly candid
as to his reasons for burning the draft card, conduct combining
ordinary "speech" and "non speech" could be regulated by the gov-
ernment if: (1) The regulation was within the constitutional power
of the government; (2) the regulation furthered an "important or
substantial governmental interest"42; (3) that interest was "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression"43; and (4) the "incidental
restriction" on the First Amendment in O'Brien's case was "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance" of the government's
interest." The Court found that all of these requirements were sat-
isfied and held that the regulation and O'Brien's conviction were
constitutional.45 The Court opined that "[we] cannot accept this
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct ... intends
thereby to express an idea."
O'Brien also argued that Congress's purpose in enacting the
statute was to suppress public dissent and the regulation should thus
be examined under heightened scrutiny.47 The Court rejected this
argument holding that Congress's motive for enacting a statute is
irrelevant in the First Amendment analysis, as long as there was a
legitimate purpose which could support the statute, regardless of
whether or not Congress actually relied on it.' This view was ech-
oed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in a recent decision on a
challenge to the state's own hunter harassment statute. The court
held:
[I]ntentional noisemaking for the purpose of harassing a hunter
would fall within the statute regardless of whether the noisemaker
was motivated by a philosophical commitment to the protection of
animal rights, by a determination to protest the hunter's choice of
weapon or by a felt need to engage in public prayer. ...
... Just as legislative history cannot add words to a statute
that it does not contain ... such history cannot render unconsti-
41 Id. at 376.
42 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 369, 377 (1968).
43 id.
" Id.
41 Id. at 367.
46 Id. at 376.




tutional a statute that meets constitutional standards on its face. A
statute that is otherwise constitutional does not become invalid "on
the basis of an illicit legislative motive."'49
However, later United States Supreme Court decisions indicate that
Congress's motive can be constitutionally relevant."
2. Tinker v. Des Moines School District"
Several high school and junior high students were suspended
for wearing black armbands as part of a Vietnam War protest be-
cause the students had violated a school rule banning such
armbands. 2 The Supreme Court held that the restriction violated
the students' First Amendment rights." The Court noted that the
school authorities' attempt to avoid potentially disruptive conduct5
4
is not a valid reason for forbidding the expression. "Undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression."" In this situation, the Court ap-
peared to apply the heightened scrutiny standard allowing the re-
striction only if necessary to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est. 6
3. Texas v. Johnson5 7 and United States v. Eichman58
Two recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue of
First Amendment protection for symbolic speech by ruling on gov-
ernmental restrictions on flag desecration. In Texas v. Johnson, the
defendant was charged with violating an anti-desecration statute for
burning an American flag at a political demonstration outside the
Republican National Convention in Dallas.5 The Texas statute
made it a crime to "intentionally or knowingly desecrate ... a state
49 State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 897-98 (Conn. 1993) (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
I d. at 503.
I d. at 514.
I' Id. at 507.
I d. at 508.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
496 U.S. 310 (1990).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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or national flag. ' " The statute defined "desecrate" as to "deface,
damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe
or discover his action."' At trial, several witnesses testified that
they had been seriously offended by the flag burning.62
The Court held that the Texas statute, as applied, violated the
First Amendment. 63 The Court applied the heightened scrutiny
standard after determining that the prosecution of Johnson was
"directly related to [his intended] expression." The Court ana-
lyzed the two objectives Texas stated it was pursuing through the
prohibition of flag desecration: (1) preventing breaches of the peace;
and (2) preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and nation-
hood.65 The Court held that preventing breaches of the peace was
not what actually motivated Texas in this case, since no disturbance
occurred or was threatened in this particular incident.' The Court
also held that the objective of preserving the flag as a symbol of
national unity may have been worthwhile, but this interest in "na-
tionhood" was outweighed by the need to uphold First Amendment
rights.61 "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."68 The Court specifically addressed the possibility
of violent reactions to incidents of flag desecration by those offend-
ed by such acts:
The State's position, therefore amounts to a claim that an
audience that takes serious offense at articular expression is nec-
essarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be
prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a
presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal
function of free speech is to invite dispute. [Free speech] may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. It would be odd indeed to conclude both that
o Id. at 400, n.1.
1 Id.
62 Id. at 408.
63 Id. at 400.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
' Id. at 407.
6 Id. at 410




if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence
is a reason for according it constitutional protection, and that the
government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas
on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness
will provoke violence.69
U.S. v. Eichman involved a decision on the constitutionality of
a federal anti-desecration statute which applied to anyone who
"knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United
States... ." Even though the statute did not rely on "offense to
others" to define the prohibited activity as had the Texas statute in
Johnson, the Court found this statute also violated the First Amend-
ment.7 The Court found that this statute, like its Texas counterpart,
was a content-based restriction on symbolic speech: "Although the
[Act] contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of
the prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the government's
asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free expression,'
and concerned with the content of such expression."72
B. Symbolic Speech In Application to the Federal Hunter Harass-
ment Statute
Perhaps the strongest argument available to a challenger of the
federal hunter harassment statute is that it is an unconstitutional
limitation on symbolic speech. However, there is little legislative
history to suggest that Congress's intent in enacting the statute was
to stifle the content of the message delivered by the animal rights
activists. The activists could argue that their conduct in attempting
to prevent hunters from killing animals itself is intended primarily
for the message it sends to the public. Protesters have intentionally
targeted high-profile hunts to gain media attention, such as the an-
nual quail hunt of former President Bush.73 Animal rights activists
can also attack the validity of the governmental interest of possible
disturbances could result from these symbolic acts citing both Tinker
and Johnson.
Id. at 408-09 (citations and quotations omitted).
"o U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990).
71 id.
" id at 315.
7' Animal Lovers to Protest Bush Hunting Vacation, ARiz. REPUBUc, Dec. 25,
1991, at A6.
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A similar argument, however, failed to persuade the Montana
Supreme Court in State v. Lilburn.74 The court overruled the hold-
ing of the district court that the Montana hunter harassment statute
was "obviously content-based" and could apply to "all verbal and
expressive conduct which has the intention to dissuade from hunt-
ing. Conduct such as prayer at trailheads, the singing of protest
songs or the burning of hunting maps, if done with the intent to
dissuade a hunter, would be violations of the statute."75 The Mon-
tana court did not apply heightened scrutiny. It held that the hunter
harassment statute was content-neutral noting:
While the disturbance which is prohibited may, under other cir-
cumstances, result from a verbal utterance, it makes no difference
what the content of the verbal utterance is. The language of the
statute does not support the assertion that the statute is aimed
primarily at pure speech and expressive conduct conveying only
an anti-hunting sentiment. The disturbance could just as well be
caused by shouting "fire!".
76
C. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on the time, place
and manner of a particular activity are valid under the First Amend-
ment if: (1) they are "content-neutral;" (2) they are "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest;" and (3) "alter-
native channels are left available for communicating the informa-
tion. '77 The location where the expression takes place affects the
test to be applied. The above test applies when the expression takes
place in a public forum. Examples of public forums include streets,
sidewalks, parks7 , open government meetings', and municipal the-
aters."0
If the forum is found to be a semi-public forum, the test ap-
plied is "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
74 875 P.2d 1036 (Mont. 1994), cert. denied, Lilbum v. Montana, 63 U.S.L.W.
3514 (1995).
" State v. Lilburn, 875 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Mont. 1994).
7 id. at 1041-42.
7 City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798
(1984).
' See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
71 See City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
8o See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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with the normal activity of particular place at a particular time."
81
Semi-public forums include schools82, libraries 3, and fair-
grounds. 4
If the expression takes place in a non-public forum, the gov-
ernment regulation must merely be reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum. 5 Non-public forums include airport ter-
minals8 6, jails", military bases 8 , courthouses"9 , governmental
workplaces, 90 and buses9'. In 1983 the Supreme Court more suc-
cinctly set forth the approach to determining the constitutionality of
a restriction on speech based, in part, on the degree of "publicness"
associated with the forum of the attempted expression.92
, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
82 Id.
'5 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
14 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
"5 Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 783 (1992).
36 id.
8 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
88 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
89 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
'0 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
9' See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the
Supreme Court set forth the law as to time, place and manner restrictions on expression
depending on where the regulated expression is attempted as follows:
[I]n places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devot-
ed to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activ-
ity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and
parks which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and [since] time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." In these quintessential public forums, the government may not
prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The
state may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of ex-
pression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. A second category consists of public property which the
state has opened for the public as a place for expressive activity. The
Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the
forum in the first place. Although a state is not required to indefinitely
retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable
time, place and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based
prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est. Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication is governed by different standards. We have recog-
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
Successful challengers of the federal hunter harassment statute
will have difficulty showing that the federal lands described in this
statute constitute public fora because the federal lands are not analo-
gous to streets or parks that have "immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public" and have been used for purposes of as-
sembly and communication. 93 The federal lands are not public
property opened by the government for purposes of assembly and
communication. The Court would probably determine that federal
lands used for hunting are government owned, non-public fora. The
government can easily meet its meager burden of demonstrating that
prohibitions on animal rights activists harassing hunters in the field
are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fora. The only
effective response by the activists would be to prove that Congress's
intent in passing this statute was to suppress content-based speech.
If the federal courts follow the lead of the Montana and Connecticut
courts, the hunter harassment statute will withstand any challenges
on First Amendment grounds.
III. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
There are other possible grounds upon which to challenge the
hunter harassment law, however. The Supreme Court has held that a
"[p]enal statute ... must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties." 4 Courts approach this through the use of
two doctrines - overbreadth and vagueness. In Dorman v. Satt9 5,
the Second Circuit found Connecticut's hunter harassment statute
overbroad and vague due to provisions stating that no person shall
"interfere with" or "harass" persons engaged in hunting or "acts in
preparation" for hunting. 96 The state argued the statute could be
saved by a limiting construction. The court rejected this argument,
relying on the holding in Houston v. Hill,97 that the words "inter-
fere," "harass," and "acts in preparation of' do not allow a limiting
nized that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government."
460 U.S. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
9' 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
'6 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1990).
" 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
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construction because "[t]hey can mean anything.""8
A. Overbreadth
A statute is overbroad if it is not aimed specifically at curbing
"evils within the allowable area of [state] control, but ... sweeps
within its ambit other activities." 99 This doctrine has been signifi-
cantly curtailed by the decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,"
which involved a challenge to a statute which was, like hunter ha-
rassment laws, primarily directed at regulating conduct and not pure
speech.' The Supreme Court found that the statute was not "sub-
stantially overbroad," since it applied to a substantial spectrum of
conduct that could be constitutionally subjected to governmental
regulation." 2
The carefully worded federal hunter harassment statute is di-
rected primarily, if not entirely, at regulating conduct." 3 Thus, just
as with the First Amendment analysis, absent a showing that the
true purpose of this statute is to restrict symbolic expression, a
challenge under the overbreadth doctrine will fail.
B. Vagueness
There are two possible grounds to challenge a statute as uncon-
stitutionally vague: (1) show that "persons of ordinary intelligence
and experience [have not been] afforded a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior
accordingly;"'0' 4 or (2) show that the statute "fails to provide legal-
ly fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial offi-
cers, triers of fact and others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply
and administer the penal laws."'0 5
The federal hunter harassment statute avoids these difficulties
because its application is limited to those who "intentionally...
engage in any physical conduct that significantly hinders a lawful
9 Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436.
9' Thombill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 90 (1940).
'0 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 16 U.S.C. § 5207 (8).
'o Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978). See also Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
o Bowers, 389 A.2d at 345. See also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 1099.
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hunt."'06 There may be an argument that the use of the word "any"
is overbroad and vague. For example, would it violate the statute if
a protester attempts to talk a hunter out of a planned lawful hunt on
a public forum while the hunter is in route to the hunt? By defining
conduct not to include First Amendment protected speech the statute
attempts to answer this question." 7 However, unlike the Montana
statute in Lilburn, which the state court noted that the regulated
conduct was limited to obstructing those "engaged" in a lawful
hunt"8 , the federal statute's usage of the word "engage" refers to
the physical conduct itself rather than when that conduct takes
place. So it is possible that the federal statute has the same vague-
ness and overbreadth problems that the Connecticut statute in
Dorman contained.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT
A governmental action which prevents expression from occur-
ring (as opposed to punishing it once it has occurred) is presumed
to be constitutionally invalid."° Only in very rare cases in which
there is a virtual certainty the speech "will surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" will
a prior restraint on speech be found constitutionally valid."0 Thus
the provision for injunctive relief in the federal hunter harassment
law may is troubling.
Injunctive relief against a violation of section 5201 of this title
may be sought by -
(1) the head of a State agency with jurisdiction over fish or
wildlife management;
(2) the Attorney General of the United States; or
(3) any person who is or would be adversely affected by the
violation."'
The government can still argue that the hunter harassment
statute only covers physical conduct and does not implicate the First
Amendment."2 Therefore a prior restraint of free speech is not in-
-- 16 U.S.C. § 5201.
107 16 U.S.C. § 5207(8).
" State v. Lilbum, 875 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Mont. 1994).
'09 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1041 (1988).
10 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971).
16 U.S.C. § 5203.
1 16 U.S.C. § 5207(8).
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volved, but merely an injunction to stop illegal physical interfer-
ences with lawful hunting.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Recreational Hunting Safety statute is carefully
drafted to avoid a constitutional challenge. There are, however,
strong arguments that: (1) the statute impermissibly chills constitu-
tionally protected symbolic expression; (2) the statute is vague and
overbroad; and (3) the statute works as a prior restraint on expres-
sion. Another much weaker argument is that the governmental inter-
est is not strong enough to justify the chill on protected speech
under any standard. This statute will probably survive a challenge
by animal rights protesters. Challengers may be more successful in
limiting hunting by educating the public on the problems with al-
lowing hunting and building a base of public opinion before chal-
lenging the strength of the governmental interest involved.
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